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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Clients not only place their trust, but also their livelihood, and many times their 
lives, in the hands of their attorneys.  These clients can rest assured that the 
information they relay to and receive from their attorneys is protected by the well 
known “attorney-client” privilege and will remain secret.  Or can they?   
Certain cases can involve months of work and research, which can end in the 
accumulation of hundreds, even thousands of written documents.  Many of these 
documents are communications between the attorney and client, which may fall 
within the parameters of the attorney-client privilege.  These privileged documents 
could reflect trial strategies, personal issues of the client, and legal advice.  These 
documents could mean the difference between the client’s being a free individual 
and going to jail, or the difference between the client’s earning or losing one million 
dollars.   
The client’s limited knowledge of the attorney-client privilege may lead him or 
her to believe that since these documents are “privileged,” they may never be found 
out, or even if discovered, they may never be used by the opposing party unless the 
client expressly waives the privilege.  However, the situation may be quite the 
contrary.  For example, In a number of federal jurisdictions, if the attorney or client 
inadvertently loses possession of documents, or disposes of documents and the 
opposing party ends up with them, the privilege may be considered waived.   
This paper will explore the different schools of thought on the inadvertent waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege, with an emphasis on the case of McCafferty’s Inc. v. 
                                                                
1B.S. summa cum laude, 1997, University of Maryland Eastern Shore; J.D., 2000, 
University of Baltimore School of Law.  Mr. Gaither currently practices law in Annapolis, 
Maryland.  I would like to thank Professor Lynn McLain for her outstanding instruction and 
criticisms as this article developed.  I would also like to thank my parents William and Mary 
Gaither, for their continued support. 
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Bank of Glen Burnie.2  In McCafferty’s, the client, who was the director of human 
resources at the Bank of Glen Burnie, tore up and discarded a memorandum that had 
been sent to her by the bank’s attorney.  The document ended up in a dumpster on 
the Bank of Glen Burnie’s property, where a private investigator for the opposing 
party searched, finding the memo.  The United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland stated that the attorney-client privilege can be waived involuntarily, but 
held that no waiver had occurred under the circumstances of the case.3  
This paper will first define the attorney-client privilege, and explore the forms of 
waiving the attorney-client privilege: voluntary, implied, and inadvertent.  Next the 
discussion will focus on the three schools of federal case law concerning inadvertent 
waiver, known as the “lenient approach,” the “strict approach,” and the “middle-
ground approach,” with an emphasis on the middle-ground approach as adopted by 
McCafferty’s.  The paper then will introduce the possibility of a new “hybrid” 
approach to inadvertent waiver of the privilege.  The discussion will continue with 
analyzing agency law and its parallels to the attorney-client privilege.  Finally this 
paper will conclude that the hybrid approach is the most appropriate test. 
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
The United States Supreme Court has described the attorney-client privilege, now 
applied in the federal courts under Federal Rule of Evidence 501,4 as the “oldest of 
the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”5  The 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and frank 
communications between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”6  The 
privilege helps attorneys gain information from their clients to properly prepare for 
the case.  The attorney-client privilege covers advice given by the attorney as well as 
information given to the attorney by the client so that the attorney may render 
advice.7   
                                                                
2179 F.R.D. 163 (D. Md. 1998). 
3Id. at 169-70. 
4FED. R. EVID. 501 states: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by 
Act of Congress or  in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political 
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they 
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and 
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a 
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a 
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
determined in accordance with State law.  
Therefore the common law of privileges as interpreted by courts governs the attorney-client 
privilege. 
5Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
6Id. 
7Id. at 390. 
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The privilege is “limited to communications expressly intended to be 
confidential, and some showing of an intention of secrecy must be made.”8  
However, the privilege impedes full and frank discovery of the truth and  therefore, 
like other privileges, is strictly construed by the courts.9  The party claiming the 
privilege has the burden of proving all of the essential elements of the privilege:10  
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be a client; (2) the person to 
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his or 
her subordinate, and (b) in connection with this communication, the attorney is 
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of third parties not enjoying a 
privileged relationship (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion 
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) 
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) 
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.11   
The holder of the privilege is the client, and therefore, only the client or his or her 
representative, such as a guardian, trustee, personal representative, or attorney, may 
claim or waive the privilege.12 
III.  FORMS OF WAIVING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
As previously stated, the final element of the attorney-client privilege calls for 
the privilege to be claimed, and not waived.13  Waiver of the privilege may be either 
express or implied.14  Some courts hold that implied waiver may even be 
inadvertent.15 
A.  Voluntary Waiver 
Waiver occurs when the client voluntarily discloses the privileged 
communications to a third party to either: intentionally waive the privilege; to 
abandon confidentiality; or for using the confidential communications for purposes 
other than seeking legal advice.16  When a client relays confidential, privileged 
information for any of these three reasons, a court may find voluntary waiver 
because the communication is not made in furtherance of the purpose of the 
                                                                
8Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Wash. 1975). 
9E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984). 
10In re Int’l Harvester’s Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 
1987). 
11McCafferty’s Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 166-67 (D. Md. 1998). 
12See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § Standard 503.20  (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997) 
(defining the lawyer-client privilege and its exceptions). 
13McCafferty’s Inc., 179 F.R.D. at 167. 
14Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1985). 
15Hydraflow, Inc.  v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 636 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
16In re Int’l Harvester’s Disposition of Wis. Steel., 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 
1987). 
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privilege.  For example, a client may be questioned about conversations he had with 
his attorneys.  If the client’s attorneys do not object to his answering these questions, 
and the client answers them, the privilege is considered voluntarily waived.17   
Voluntary waiver is not very controversial, because if it is found that the client 
intended for a third party to know of the “privileged” information, there is no need 
for the courts to recognize the information as privileged.  If the client intentionally 
relinquishes his or her right, he is not able to reinstate the privilege at a later time. 
B.  Implied Waiver 
The privilege can also be waived implicitly when a client injects the advice of 
counsel as an issue in the litigation.18  For example, a client may assert reliance on 
the advice of the attorney as an affirmative defense, or may sue the attorney for 
malpractice.   
In one federal case, the plaintiff was an inmate who sued the State penitentiary 
for violating his due process rights, for confining him to the mental health unit 
without a hearing.  The defense was based on discretionary decisions of public 
officials, who are immune from suits for damages if they acted in good faith.  
Plaintiff tried to counter the “good faith” aspect of the defense by requesting 
documents of legal advice which were given to the defendants by the state’s 
Attorney General, and the defendants claimed attorney-client privilege.  The court 
held that the defendant’s claim of immunity placed the otherwise protected legal 
advice at issue, and asserting the privilege deprived the plaintiff of information 
necessary to counter the defense.19  Therefore, the defendants had impliedly waived 
the attorney client privilege with respect to the legal advice.20 
The idea of implied waiver should cause litigants to think about what claims and 
defenses that they will assert as they may impliedly waive their privileges.  Like 
voluntary waiver, implied waiver is not controversial, due to the unfairness of raising 
particular claims or defenses, while not allowing the opposing party to properly 
refute that position. 
C.  Inadvertent Waiver 
A third form of waiver of the attorney-client privilege is the inadvertent (or 
accidental) waiver.  An attorney’s inadvertent disclosure of an otherwise privileged 
document may waive the privilege.21  Courts have generally followed one of three 
distinct approaches to inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege: (1) the 
strict approach, (2) the lenient approach and (3) the “middle-ground” approach, 
which is also called the “Hydraflow” approach.22   
                                                                
17Hollins, 773 F.2d at 197. 
18Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 486 (3d Cir. 1995). 
19Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975). 
20Id. at 583. 
21Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 636 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
22Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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1.  Strict Approach 
Under the strict approach, once privileged communication is inadvertently 
discovered by the opposing party, the attorney-client privilege is deemed waived.  In 
a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Circuit of the District of 
Columbia,23 the Grand Jury subpoenaed records of a company regarding a criminal 
investigation for tax evasion, and the attorney-client privilege was raised.  The 
company claimed the privilege because certain documents requested included notes 
taken during a meeting with company attorneys and memoranda containing legal 
advice.  The government agreed that the documents had been privileged, but argued 
that the privilege was waived because the documents had been viewed by the 
Internal Revenue Service, a third party.  The Internal Revenue Service viewed these 
documents through the submission of the company’s taxes.  The Court of Appeals 
held that it did not matter “whether the waiver is labeled ‘voluntary’ or 
‘inadvertent,’” in either case, waiver occurred.24  The Court of Appeals stated that the 
client had the duty to keep the documents confidential:  
Although the attorney-client privilege is  of ancient lineage and continuing 
importance, the confidentiality of communications covered by the 
privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of the privilege lest it be 
waived.  The courts  will grant no greater protection to those who assert  
the privilege than their own precautions warrant.25   
The strict approach gives no mercy to the client.  This approach provides strong 
incentives for attorneys and clients to be careful with documents, but warrants no 
protection to the clients for accidental disclosure.  This approach has been rejected 
by most of the circuits due to its inflexible, harsh outcome.26 
2.  Lenient Approach 
The 9th and 11th Circuits follow the lenient approach, under which the privilege 
remains intact, unless it is knowingly waived.27  The rationale for the lenient 
approach is that the client should not be punished for the negligence of the attorney.28   
For example, in a case before the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, the defendant sought the production of four letters from the 
plaintiff, who claimed the attorney-client privilege.29  The defendant argued that the 
privilege had been waived because the plaintiff’s attorney had earlier, inadvertently, 
produced the letters to the defense attorney for a short time.  The court rejected the 
defendant’s argument and stated: “We are taught from first year law school that 
waiver imports the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’  
                                                                
23In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
24Id. at 980. 
25Id. 
26Gray, 86 F. 3d at 1483. 
27Id. 
28Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 939 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
29Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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Inadvertent production is the antithesis of that concept.”30  The court explained that, 
“if we are serious about the attorney-client privilege and its relation to the client’s 
welfare, we should require more than such negligence by counsel before the client 
can be deemed to have given up the privilege.”31 
The lenient approach creates the opposite result of the strict approach.  Under this 
test, there is little incentive for a lawyer to maintain tight control over privileged 
documents.32  This test does effectuate the principle behind the attorney-client 
privilege, protecting the client, who must waive the privilege.  However, the 
approach ignores the confidentiality aspect of the privilege.33 
3.  Middle-Ground Approach 
The final approach that some courts have applied to inadvertent waiver is the 
“middle-ground” approach.  This approach uses a five-part analysis to decide 
whether the inadvertent disclosure should be considered a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege.34  The court considers: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions 
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of document production, 
(2) the number of inadvertent disclosures, (3) the extent of the disclosures, (4) the 
promptness of measures taken to rectify the disclosure, and (5) whether the 
overriding interest of justice would be served by relieving the party of its error.35   
In McCafferty’s, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
chose to follow the middle-ground approach, indicating that the Fourth Circuit 
“appears to have adopted” the middle ground approach.36  The district court 
enumerated five situations in which courts have held the attorney-client privilege 
inadvertently waived:  
inadvertent disclosure has been deemed to evidence an abandonment of 
the requisite intent to maintain confidentiality, and thereby waive the 
attorney-client privilege, where (1) conversations between attorneys and 
clients in a public place are over-heard by others; (2) there is 
indiscriminate mingling of attorney-client privileged documents with 
documents which will be subject to routine disclosure to third persons 
without having taken pre-cautions to protect the privileged documents 
                                                                
30Id. at 955. 
31Id. 
32Gray, 86 F.3d at 1483. 
33Id. 
34Id. at 1483-84. 
35Id. at 1484. 
36See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (The Fourth 
Circuit did not rule on the issue of waiver because the court found that there was no attorney-
client privilege to begin with; however, the court did recognize that other courts recognize 
inadvertent waiver, and it hints to the middle-ground approach in its language, stating, “it has 
been held that privilege may be lost, ‘even if the disclosure is inadvertent’ such as in some 
circumstances ‘eavesdroppers,’ and again, where if the privileged communication consisted of 
‘privileged documents,’ the party did not ‘take reasonable steps to insure and maintain [their] 
confidentiality.”). 
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from disclosure; (3) privileged documents are stolen or taken because they 
were not adequately protected; (4) privileged documents are kept in file 
cabinets routinely used by others, and (5) privileged papers are left in 
places accessible to the public.37 
The court also listed examples of precautions that evidence an intent to maintain 
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality in documents, such as (1) labeling 
privileged documents as such at their origination; (2) segregating documents in their 
own separate files; (3) establishing policies to limit access to privileged materials; 
(4) shredding, not simply discarding, privileged materials; and (5) if unauthorized 
individuals do gain access to privileged materials, taking “immediate remedial steps” 
to obtain their return.38 
In McCafferty’s, the documents in question were discarded by the client.  The 
paper was torn into sixteen pieces, placed in a plastic bag with other trash, and 
placed in a dumpster on the bank’s property.  The dumpster had a sign on it stating 
that it was for the exclusive use of the Bank of Glen Burnie.  An investigator for the 
opposing side went into the dumpster and located the torn pieces of the privileged 
document. 
The court concluded that tearing the document into sixteen pieces evidenced the 
client’s intent to maintain confidentiality.39  Although the client could have done 
more to protect confidentiality, “the issue is not whether every conceivable 
precaution which could have been taken was taken, but whether reasonable 
precautions were taken.”40  Finally, the court concluded that under the five factor 
test, there was no waiver of the privilege as:  
(1) [The client’s] actions to preserve the confidentiality of the memo were 
reasonable; (2) there was but a single disclosure; (3) the disclosure was 
limited in scope; (4) there was no delay in measures taken by BGB to 
rectify the disclosure once it was discovered; and (5) interests of justice 
militate against a finding of waiver given the facts of this case.41 
Other lower courts have also adopted the middle-ground approach to inadvertent 
waiver.  The United States District Court for the Western District of New York has 
rejected both the strict and lenient tests in favor of the middle-ground approach.  The 
court stated that the strict approach has a deterrent effect but it “sacrifice[s] the value 
of protecting client [confidentiality] in the name of certainty of results.”42  The 
lenient approach, in focusing solely on the intent of the client to waive the privilege, 
is too lenient, because clients would always deny any intention to ever waive the 
privilege.43 
                                                                
37McCafferty’s Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 168 (D. Md. 1998).  
38Id. 
39Id. at 169. 
40Id. 
41Id. at 170. 
42Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
43Id. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also accepted the 
middle-ground approach, stating:  
An analysis which permits the court to consider the circumstances 
surrounding a disclosure on a case-by-case basis is preferable to a per se 
rule of waiver.  This analysis serves the purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege, the protection of communications which the client fully 
intended would remain confidential, yet at the same time will not relieve 
those claiming the privilege of the consequences of their carelessness if 
the circumstances surrounding the disclosure do not clearly demonstrate 
that continued protection is warranted.”44   
This rationale by the Eighth Circuit shows the balance that the middle-ground 
approach facilitates.  The middle-ground test is a thoughtful approach allowing the 
trial court broad discretion, providing flexibility, and is “best suited to achieving a 
fair result.”45   
IV.  PROPOSAL: A HYBRID TEST 
Each of the three tests presently used by the federal courts to determine whether 
the attorney-client privilege has been inadvertently waived has its strong points, but 
the middle-ground test is the fairest to all parties.  This test, while it takes time to 
apply, ensures that the court will do a thorough review of the circumstances 
surrounding the discarded or disclosed documents.   
The strict test does not produce fair results to a client whose attorney has 
shredded and discarded privileged documents which then somehow end up in the 
possession of the opposing party.  The strict test, as a practical matter, calls for 
attorneys to either never discard privileged material by keeping them under lock and 
key forever, or to totally destroy the documents by some means such as burning the 
document.  Neither of these results is rational. 
The lenient test swings the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.  Although 
waiver of a privilege calls for it to be waived knowingly, the lenient test does not 
give any incentive to the attorney to maintain documents in a confidential fashion.  
Additionally, the defense against waiver is too easy; a mere claim that the documents 
were “inadvertently produced” is enough for the privilege to be upheld. 
The middle-ground test is the most desirable of the tests presently used.  The five 
factors used to determine waiver allow the court to use its discretion in deciding 
whether a waiver was made, but also add guidance.  This test is not a sure win for 
either party, as the strict test and lenient test prove to be.  A balance is struck 
between the importance of the attorney-client privilege and the incentive to keep 
confidential documents safe.  While the middle-ground test gives attorneys an 
incentive to properly maintain documents, it does not go to the extreme of strict test. 
In McCafferty’s, the inadvertent disclosure was due to the actions of the client 
who discarded the document.  The hybrid-test proposed in this paper, however, 
separates inadvertent disclosures by the client from those made by the attorney.  
Most of the cases involving inadvertent disclosure are in reference to the actions of 
the attorney, who is usually in control of the documents.  A majority of the cases 
                                                                
44Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993). 
45Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/4
2000] THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 319 
discussed dealt with the situation in which the attorney negligently disclosed the 
documents contrary to what the client or the attorney intended.  In these situations, 
the middle-ground test’s use of the five factors is sufficient to remedy the situation.  
However, if the attorney purposely discloses privileged material, contrary to the 
client’s intention of maintaining confidentiality, will the middle-ground test help the 
client?   
Because the attorney-client privilege is held by the client, and must be asserted 
by the client,46 if the attorney purposely discloses information contrary to the desire 
of the client to maintain confidentiality, there should be no waiver.  However, under 
the five-factor test used in the middle ground approach, waiver may be found.  Under 
the first factor, the precautions taken were probably not reasonable if the attorney 
purposely hands over documents, and under the fourth factor, the delay in measures 
taken to rectify the situation may be very substantial as the client may not learn about 
the purposeful disclosure until a long time has passed.  Additionally, the client may 
not realize that the documents were in fact privileged.   
Therefore, when courts look to the disclosure of privileged documents by 
attorneys, their first inquiry may be whether the disclosure was negligent or 
purposeful.  In the event that the disclosure was negligent, the court should move to 
the five-factor test used in the middle-ground approach.  In the event that the 
disclosure by the attorney was purposeful, but the disclosure was inadvertent in the 
eyes of the client, (the client did not know of, or authorize the attorney’s actions), the 
court should automatically rule that the privilege was not waived, as if following the 
lenient test.  This outcome is warranted in the interest of justice, because the client’s 
privilege was circumvented by the purposeful actions of the attorney. 
A malpractice suit against the attorney for disclosing privileged information will 
be inadequate because the remedy will be too little, too late.  The client will not 
receive an immediate remedy, but must wait until after the harm is done, the 
privileged material is not recovered, and the case is most likely lost.  Finally, even if 
the client wins the malpractice suit against the attorney, it will not change the harm 
caused by losing the privileged information.  
The agency relationship of the attorney to the client should not change this 
outcome.47  Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, there is a clause which 
parallels the essence of the attorney-client privilege.48  The attorney, as an agent of 
the client, is liable to the client for conveying confidential information without 
permission of the client.49  While the agent/client may have recourse for the 
attorney’s actions, under agency law it may be too late, because negligent acts of the 
agent, and speech by the agent authorized or apparently authorized to speak on the 
                                                                
46McCafferty’s Inc. v. The Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 166-67 (D. Md. 1998). 
47Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958) (defining an agency relationship as a 
“manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s acceptance of the 
undertaking and the understanding [of the parties] that the principal is to be in control of the 
undertaking”). 
48See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (1958) (stating that an agent is not to use or 
communicate confidential information given by the principal or discovered during the course 
of his or her agency). 
49See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 401 (1958) (stating that an agent is liable to the 
principal for damages caused by the agent’s breach of duty). 
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principal’s behalf, binds the principal.50  Under this agency analysis, the negligent 
disclosure of privileged material by the attorney may bind the client, contrary to the 
lenient, middle-ground, and proposed hybrid test. 
Lawyers have a greater responsibility to their clients than do other agents, 
because lawyers are officers of the court.51  A lawyer’s responsibility even reaches 
beyond their established clients to prospective clients who relay privileged 
information.52  Since lawyers have a higher duty to their principals, more than mere 
agency law governs the lawyer’s actions.  While under a strict agency approach, the 
client may have little or no recourse, under the current law, particularly following the 
lenient and middle-ground approach, the client may have immediate recourse. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There needs to be unity throughout the federal circuits with regard to inadvertent 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  There are several flaws with the strict and 
lenient test currently used.  Although they provide definite, clear results, these results 
are made at the expense of one party.  The middle-ground analysis used by some 
circuits is the best approach because it looks at several factors to determine whether 
waiver occurred. 
However, even the middle-ground approach could use improvement, and 
consider more factors such as negligent(accidental) versus purposeful disclosure by 
the attorney, understanding that both forms of disclosure can be “inadvertent” in the 
eyes of the client who holds the privilege.  Neither agency law nor malpractice 
claims completely and fairly address the issue of purposeful but unauthorized 
disclosure by the attorney.  Therefore, courts should adopt the two-part, hybrid test 
which combines the lenient approach for purposeful disclosure by the attorney made 
contrary to the client’s wishes, and the middle-ground test for negligent disclosures 
by the attorney. 
 
                                                                
50Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer As Agent, 67 FDM. L. REV. 301 (1998). 
51Id. at 311. 
52Id. 
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